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I.
The

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND CASE HISTORY
Utah

State

Court

of

Appeals

has

appellate

jurisdiction over this matter pursuant to §78-2a3(2)(j), Utah Code
Annotatedf (1953 as amended).

The nature of the proceedings below

involve a damages suit against the defendants as a result of their
issuing corporate checks as managing officers and directors of the
corporation to the plaintiff that were subsequently dishonored
upon presentment.
II.
1.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
Do partial payments of a debt obligation toll the

statute of limitations to the date of the last partial payment
pursuant to §76-12-44, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended)?
2.

Does

§78-12-40,

Utah

Code

Annotated

(1953

as

amended) provide one year from the dismissal of the Complaint in
the United States District Court for lack of federal jurisdiction?

3.

Can the District Court determine basis for granting

Summary Judgment in the nature of waiver and laches, when said
basis were not raised in the Defendants1 (moving party) Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment?
4.

Does actual "in person" notice satisfy the notice

requirements of §7-15-1, et. seq., Utah Code Annotated, (1953 as
amended)?
-1-

III.

DETERMINITIVE STATUTES

Utah Code Annotated, §7-15-1, et. seq., as amended (See
addendum).
Utah Code Annotated, §78-12-40, as amended:
If any action is commenced within due
time and a judgment thereon for the
plaintiff is reversed, or if the
plaintiff fails in such action or upon
a cause of action otherwise that upon
the merits, and the time limited either
by law or contract for commencing the
same shall have expired, the plaintiff,
or if he dies and the cause of actions
survives, his
representatives, may
commence a n*>w action within one year
after
the
reversal
or
failure.

Utah Code Annotated, §78-12-44, as amended:
In any case founded on contract, when any
part of the principal or interest shall
have been paid, or an acknowledgement of an
existing liability, debt or claim, or any
promise to pay the same, shall have been
made, an action may be brought within the
period prescribed for the same after such
payment, acknowledgement or promise; but
such acknowledgement or promise must be in
writing, signed by the party to be charged
thereby. When a right of action is barred
by the provisions of any statute, it shall
be unavailable either as a cause of action
or ground of defense.
IV.

STATEMENT OF CASE

Plaintiff, Pioneer Credit Union, formerly known as
EIML Credit Union, (Pioneer) appeal from a Summary Judgment in
favor of the defendants entered by the Honorable Raymond S. Uno,
-2-

Third

Judicial

District

Judge,

on

February

6,

1990.

Plaintifffs Complaint asserts three causes of action.

First,

for payment of unpaid wages pursuant to §34-28-3, Utah Code
Annotated; second, for fraud; and, third for damages caused by
the issuance of the bad checks, incorporating Sections 7-15-1,
et. seq., and 34-28-3, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
All

three

causes

of

action

arise

out

of

the

defendants' acts as managing officers and agents of IML Freight,
Inc., whereby the defendants

issued corporate checks to the

plaintiff pursuant to a well established payroll deduction plan
for

employees'

wages.

Pioneer

relied

upon

the

established

procedure and credited the employees' accounts for the payroll
deductions.

When Pioneer presented the checks for payment, they

were dishonored

for insufficient funds.

Subsequent payments

were made by the defendants as managing officers and agents of
the corporation to the plaintiff until the corporation filed a
Chapter 11 Bankruptcy on or about July 15, 1983.
V.

PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION IN THE COURT BELOW
1.

Plaintiff filed the complaint in the State Court

on or about January 17, 1987.

The defendants were served with

Summons and Complaint on or about January 19, 1987.
la.
action
Court

against

(Page 2).

On or about July 1, 1986, plaintiff filed an
the defendants

in the United States District

for the District of Utah, Central Division, including
-3-

three pendant state claims which are the three cause of action
reasserted by the plaintiff in the state court action described
in paragraph 1.

On or about January 14, 1987, the United States

District

made

Court

and

entered

a Judgment

and

Order of

Dismissal, dismissing the case upon the grounds and

that the

court had no jurisdiction to grant the federal relief sought and
that since there was no federal claim over which the court had
jurisdiction, the pendent state claims were also dismissed for
lack of jurisdiction.
2.

The defendants, on or about February 17, 1987,

filed an Answer to the Complaint.
3.

Plaintiff, on or about August 30, 1989, filed a

Motion for Summary Judgment.
4.

(Page 12).

(Page 82).

On or about October 3, 1989, the defendants filed

a Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
5.

(Page 161).

On or about November 20, 1989, a hearing was held

before the Honorable Raymond S. Uno on the cross motions for
Summary Judgment.

Oral argument was given by counsel for the

plaintiff, however because of insufficient time, oral argument
for the defendants was continued to Wednesday, December 6, 1989.
(Order, dated December 6, 1989, page 197).
6.
December

Oral argument was given by defendants on or about

6, 1989, on the cross motions for Summary Judgment.

(Order dated December 6, 1989, page 197).
-4-

7.

The Third Judicial District Court, on December llf

1989 made and entered its Order denying plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment.
8.

(Page 197).

The defendants Motion for Partial Summary Judgment

was taken under advisement and the parties were

granted the

opportunity to file further written memoranda with the court.
(Order dated December 11, 1989, page 197).
9.

Plaintiff filed its Response to Defendants' Oral

Argument in Support of Defendants' Motion for Partial Summary
Judgment on or about December 20, 1989.
10.
Plaintiff's

Judgment.

Defendants filed their Memorandum in Response to
Memorandum

Memorandum

(Page 201).

in

Support

dated
of

December

Their

20,

Motion

1989

for

and

Partial

Final
Summary

(Page 233).
11.

The Third Judicial District Court, on or about

January 9, 1990, entered a "Minute Entry" granting Defendants'
Motion for Partial Summary Judgment and instructed Defendants to
prepare the Order.
12.

(Page 258).

Plaintiff

filed

its

Amended

Objection

Defendants' Proposed Order on or about January 24, 1990.

to

(Page

264).
13.

Plaintiff acknowledged and stipulated that if the

District Court entered the Summary Judgment as proposed by the
Defendants,

that

the

basis
-5-

set

forth

therein

for

Summary

Judgment

would

Plaintiff's

also

Second

provide

basis

for

the

dismissal

of

Cause of Action, for fraud, although not

included in the original Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
(Page 265).
14.

The Third Judicial District Court entered Summary

Judgment in favor of defendants and against the plaintiff, "NO
CAUSE OF ACTION", on February 6, 1990.
15.

Plaintiff, Pioneer Credit Onion, filed its Notice

of Appeal on February 28, 1990.
VI.
1.
and

agents

(Page 271).

(Page 298).

STATEMENT OF FACTS

The defendants were managing executive officers
of

the

corporation,

IML

Freight,

Inc.

(IML).

Defendant Lee served as Chairman of the Board of Directors and
as Chief Executive Officer, defendant Price

served as Chief

Financial Officer, and defendant Schofield served as Executive
Vice-President and Chief Operating Officer.
para.

2,

page

151;

Price

affidavit

para.

(Lee affidavit,
2,

page

145;

Defendants1 Memorandum in opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for
Summary Judgment, para. 3, page 115; Summary Judgment, para. 2,
page 273).
2.

Plaintiff, Pioneer Credit Union, provided credit

union services to the employees of the corporation
payroll deduction.

including

(Summary Judgment, para. 3, page 274).
-6-

3.

IML agreed to and did participate with the credit

union and employees of IML in a voluntary payroll deduction
plan, whereby the employees
their

earnings

deducted

who so elected had a portion of

from

their

checks

for deposit with

Pioneer for credit to the accounts of the respective employees.
(Rico affidavit, para. 4, page 94; Summary Judgment, para. 4,
page 274).
4.

The payroll deduction plan and procedure was well

known by each of the defendants in their respective positions
with the corporation.
5.

(Rico affidavit, para. 5, page 94).

These payroll procedures continued successfully

and in full effect from approximately 1959 until 1983 when IML,
through the defendants as managing officers and agents of the
corporation, failed to pay the wages to Pioneer that are in
dispute

in this case.

(Rico affidavit, para. 4, page 94;

Plaintiff's Answer to Defendants1 First Set of Interrogatories
Answer 10, page 58).
6.

For

the

payroll

periods

ending

February

8,

February 15 and February 22, 1983, under the direction of the
defendants, IML sent a computer

listing to Pioneer, whereby

Pioneer credited the participating members/employees accounts.
(Rico

affidavit,

para.

4,

page

94;

Plaintiff's

Answer

to

Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories, Answer 10, page 58).
-7-

7.

Under the direction of and by the defendants, IML,

sent three (3) checks for the respective pay periods described
in paragraph 6 that were signed by the defendants Lee and Price,
totalling $245,163.00.

(Summary Judgment, para. 5, page 274?

Rico affidavit para. 7, page 94).
8.
by Pioneer

The checks were then dishonored upon presentment
and

returned

for

insufficient

funds

to Pioneer.

(Summary Judgment, para. 6, page 274).
9.
paragraph

Subsequent to the payroll periods described in

6,

in

personal

discussions

with

Mr.

Fred

Rico,

President of Pioneer Credit Union, Pioneer informed defendants
that

the

checks

had

been

dishonored

upon

presentment.

(Plaintiff's Answer to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories,
Answer 27, page 65).
10.
the

Defendants indicated to Pioneer (Mr. Rico) that

deficient payroll amounts would be made up at some future

time.

(Plaintiff's

Answer

to

Defendants1

First

Set

of

Interrogatories, Answer 27, page 65).
11.
would

Pioneer was promised that the total amount due

be paid by the following

Friday.

When this did not

happen, Pioneer was advised that payment would be paid by the
next Tuesday, or approximately four days later.

(Plaintiff's

Answer to Defendants' First Set of Interrogatories, Answer 27,
page 65).
-8-

12.

At the subsequent Tuesday meeting, Pioneer was

informed by the defendants that IML could not pay the amounts
due to Pioneer at that time, but that Pioneer would be paid the
amount that Pioneer had credited the employee/members1 accounts
at the rate of $10,000.00, or more, per week.

(Plaintiff's

Answer to Defendants1 First Set of Interrogatories, Answer 27,
page 65).
13.

Subsequent payments totaling $58,682.00 were made

to Pioneer and applied to the outstanding balance of $245,163.00
as follows:
Date
May 4, 1983
May 6, 1983
June 15, 1983
June 17, 1983
June 24, 1983

Payment of Wages
$10,000.00
10,000.00
10,000.00
10,000.00
8,682.00

July 6, 1983
14.

The remaining outstanding balance as of July 6,

1983 is $186,481.00.
15.

10,000.00

On

(Summary Judgment, para. 8, page 275).
July

15, 1983,

IML

filed

a Chapter

11

proceeding in the United States Bankruptcy Court in the District
of Utah, and converted to a Chapter 7 proceeding on November 9,
1984.

(Summary Judgment, para. 9, page 275).
16.

Fred S. Rico, President of Pioneer Credit Union,

served as the Chairman of one of the creditors committees, in
the Bankruptcy proceedings.
could survive.

Pioneer at first believed that IML

(Plaintiff's Answer to Defendants' First Set of

Interrogatories, Answer 21, page 63).
-9-

17.

Pioneer defended an adversary proceeding brought

by the Bankruptcy Trustee on behalf of IMLf claiming the payroll
deductions received at the outset of the Chapter 11 case were
preferences.
held

The Bankruptcy Court dismissed this action and

that the payments constituted wages due.

Amended Answers to Defendants1

(Plaintiff's

First Set of Interrogatories,

Answer 21).
18.

Pioneer

Industrial Commission.

made

an

informal

inquiry

with

the

Pioneer was advised by the Industrial

Commission that it would not handle the matter and deemed it to
be a matter for a civil action.

(Plaintiff's Amended Answers to

Defendants' First Set of Interrogatoriesf Answer 22).
19.

Pioneer

filed

its original

Complaint

in the

United States District Court, District of Utah, on or about July
lf

1986, after it became apparent that recovery from IML was

unlikely.

(Summary Judgment, para. 14f page 277).
20.

The United States District Court on or about

January 9f 1987, dismissed the federal causes of action for lack
of jurisdiction, resulting in the dismissail of the pendant state
claims also being dismissed for lack of jurisdiction.

(Summary

Judgment, para. 14, page 277).
21.

As

a

result

of

the

defendants'

issuing

the

dishonored checks and Pioneer's reliance upon the defendants'
representations and partial payments, Pioneer has been damaged
-10-

in the amount of $186,481.00, plus interest at the highest legal
rate.
VII.
POINT I:

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

The partial payments made by the defendants on

the obligation resulted in tolling all applicable statutes of
limitations to the date of the last payment (July 6, 1983),
pursuant to §78-12-44, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
Pioneer's filing of its Complaint in the United States District
Court on or about July 1, 1986, was accomplished within three
years from the date of the last payment, and therefore, was
filed timely.
POINT II:

Section 78-12-40 Utah Code Annotated (1953

as amended) provides Pioneer one year from the date the United
States District Court dismissed Pioneer's Complaint for lack of
federal jurisdiction, (other than upon the merits), to refile
its Complaint in the State Court.

Pioneer refiled its Complaint

in the State Court within one week of the United States District
Court's dismissal and therefore, filed timely.
POINT III;
basis for summary

The inclusion of waiver and laches as a

judgment denied Pioneer its constitutional

right of due process.

The defendants did not raise waiver and

laches as a basis for their Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
Neither party submitted any affidavits, depositions, admissions
or filed any memoranda addressing waiver and laches as a basis
-11-

for summary judgment.

As a result, Pioneer has been denied its

opportunity to present pertinent materials in opposition to said
basis for summary judgment.
POINT IV;

Actual "in person" notice of dishonored

checks satisfies the notice requirements of §7-15-1 et seq.,
prior to filing legal action.

Section 7-15-2(1) presumes notice

to be given when written notice is deposited
States mails.

Pioneer

instead

provided

in the United

actual

"in person"

verbal notice to the defendantsf providing them an opportunity
to correct the problem.
In the alternative, if actual verbal notice is not
sufficient,

failure

to

provide

written

notice

is merely

a

procedural requirement and Pioneer should have one year from the
date of this Court's decision to provide written notice and to
refile its action.
VIII.

ARGUMENT

POINT I
ALL APPLICABLE STATUTES OF LIMITATIONS WERE
TOLLED BY §78-12-44, UTAH CODE ANNOTATED.
It is the general rule in the State of Utah that "a
cause of action for a debt begins to run when the debt is due
and payable because at that time an action can be maintained to
enforce it."

O'Hair v. Kounalis, 463 P.2d 799, 800 (Utah 1970);

Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311, 313 (Utah App. 1987).
-12-

In the

present case, it is undisputed that the cause of actions arose
when payment was denied for each of the three

checks for the

respective payroll periods in February, 1983.

It is further

undisputed that payments on the debt totaling $58,682.00 were
made by the defendants as managing officers and agents of IML,
through and including July 6, 1983.
The statute of limitations pursuant to §78-12-26 or
78-12-27, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) each establish a
three year period to file an action.

These and all other

possible statutes of limitations were tolled to the date of the
last partial payment and acknowledgement of the

existing debt

pursuant to §78-12-44, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended).
Section 78-12-44 provides:
In any case founded on contract, when any
part of the principal or interest shall have
been paid, or an acknowledgement of an
existing liability, debt or claim, or any
promise to pay the same, shall have been
made, an action may be brought within the
period prescribed for the same after such
payment, acknowledgement or promise; but
such acknowledgement or promise must be in
writing, signed by the party to be charged
thereby. When a right of action is barred
by the provisions of any statute, it shall
be unavailable either as a cause of action
or ground of defense. (emphasis added).
Interpreting

the predecessor

to §78-12-44, the Utah

State Supreme Court, in Holloway v. Wetzel, 45 P.2d 565 (Utah
1935), held that the partial payment is a reaffirmation on the
debt due.

The Court stated:
-13-

In the contemplation of a statute, the part
payment of the debt is regarded as evidence
of a willingness and obligation to pay the
residue, as conclusive as would be a
personal written promise to that effect.
It could not, then, have been intended to
give this effect to payments other than
those made by the party himself, or under
his immediate* direction. (emphasis added) .
Holloway v. Wetzel, supra, at page 568.
This Court, in Butcher v. Gilroy, 744 P.2d 311, 314
(Utah App. 1987), held that under Holloway, supra, §78-12-44
extends a statute of limitations, "only if:
payment

of

either

principal

or

interest

settlement agreement was made, (2)
the settlement agreement
direction) , and, (3)

(1)
due

partial

under

the

by the debtor/obligor of

(or by a third party at Gilroy1s

the payment was made to the creditor

under the settlement agreement."

(emphasis added).

The Utah State Supreme Court's decision in Holloway,
supra, and this Court's decision in Butler, supra, establish
that the partial payments made by the defendants through and
including

July

6,

1983,

had

the

effect

of

tolling

the

applicable statute of limitations allowing an action to be
brought within three years same after the final partial payment
pursuant to §78-12-44 U.C.A. (1953 as amended).
the

Plaintiff's

original

Complaint

in

the

The filing of
United

States

District Court on or about July 1, 1986, was filed within three
years from the date of the last payment, and therefore filed
timely.
-14-

POINT II
SECTION 78-12-40f UTAH CODE ANNOTATED
(1953 AS AMENDED) PROVIDES PLAINTIFF ONE
YEAR TO COMMENCE A NEW ACTION AFTER THE
DISMISSAL OF THE COMPLAINT FILED IN THE
FEDERAL DISTRICT COURT OTHER THAN UPON
THEIR
MERITS.
Subsequent

to

the

Bankruptcy

Court's

determination

that the partial payments paid by IML to Pioneer were wage
payments and therefore not part of the bankruptcy estatef (an
action brought by the IML Freight, Inc.f Bankruptcy Trustee
asserting that the amounts paid to the credit union were not
wages, on behalf of IMLf Pioneer

determined that recovery from

the bankruptcy was unlikely, and therefore filed its original
Complaint

in

the

Federal

District

Division, on or about July 1, 1986.

Court

of

Utah,

Central

Said Complaint alleged five

causes of action including two causes of action

under the Fair

Labor Standards Act (29 U.S.C. §201 et. seq.), and three pendent
state causes of action.

The Honorable Judge Jay Thomas Green,

held that the United States District Court lacked jurisdiction
on the two federal causes of action, therefore the pendent state
causes of action also failed for lack of jurisdiction.

The

Order of Dismissal was entered by Judge Green on January 9,
1987.

Pioneer then filed the current complaint in the Third

Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, State of
Utah, on or about January 12, 1987.
-15-

The filing of the current

complaint in the Third District Court, was filed within less
than one week of the dismissal by the Federal Court.
78-12-40,

Utah

Code

Annotated,

(1953

as

amended)

Section
provided

Pioneer one year after the dismissal to commence a new action.
Section 78-12-40, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended), states:
If any action is commenced within due* time
and a judgment thereon for the plaintiff
is reversed, or if the plaintiff fails in
such action or upon a cause of action
otherwise than upon the merits, and the
time limited either by law or contract for
commencing the same shall have expired,
the plaintiff, or if he dies and the cause
of action survives, his representatives,
may commence a new action within one year
after the reversal or failure. (Emphasis
added)
Discussing

the legislative

intent behind §78-12-40,

U.C.A., the Utah State Supreme Court has stated:
We think, however, that the purpose
behind the statute is plain and that the
legislature intended that anyone who had
a
cause
in
litigation
which
was
dismissed for some reason "otherwise
than upon the merits" should have a
reasonable time, which is set as one
year, to reassert an attempt to
establish his rights in court.
Thomas v. Braffet's Heirs, 305 P.2d 507, 510 (Utah 1956).
In a fact situation very similar to the present
case, the Utah State Supreme Court, in Rhoades v. Wright, 622
P.2d 343 (Utah 1988), held that §78-12-40 extended the time to
bring a suit to one year after the dismissal of a federal
-16-

action dismissed for lack of federal jurisdiction.

Rhoades,

supra, was a wrongful death action originally filed in the
United

States District

Court

jurisdiction and personal

for Utah, alleging

diversity

jurisdiction over the defendants

under the Utah long arm statute.

The Federal Court dismissed

the action for lack of diversity jurisdiction and subsequently
dismissed

the

jurisdiction.

pendant

state

claims

for

lack

of

federal

The plaintiffs then filed an action in Colorado

which was time-barred under the applicable Colorado statutes.
The plaintiffs then filed an action in the Utah State District
Court for San Juan County.

The court found that the Federal

District Court action was dismissed without prejudice for lack
of jurisdiction and "hence other than on the merits" and that
the subsequent filing in the Utah District Court was filed
within one year of that dismissal.

The Court held:

In applying the Utah limitation provision
for wrongful death actions, a matter
previously determined by this Court to
effect the remedy and not the cause of
action itself, we hold that the Utah
tolling statute applies and extends the
time to bring suit to one year after the
dismissal
of
the federal action, a
limitation complied with in this action,
(emphasis added)
Rhoades, supra, at page 350.
The

Utah

State

Supreme

Court

has

had

additional

occasions to discuss §78-12-40, U.C.A., and on each occasion has
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held that the plaintiff had one year from the dismissal of the
original complaint, when dismissed "other than upon the merits"
as was Pioneer's original filing in the United States District
Court.

See:

Yates v. Vernal Family Health Center, 617 P.2d 352,

354, (Utah 1980); McGuire v. University of Utah Medical Center,
603 P.2d 786, 788 (Utah 1979); Foil v. Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144
149 (Utah 1979); Madsen v. Borthick, 769 P.2d

245, 254 (Utah

1988); and, Dunn v. Kelly, 675 P.2d 571, 572 (Utah 1983).
As the Utah Supreme Court held in Rhoades v. Wright,
supra, the United States District Court's dismissal of Pioneer's
Complaint based upon lack of federal jurisdiction, was "other
than on the merits" invoking the Utah tolling statute, §78-12-4 3
U.C.A., providing Pioneer one year after the dismissal of tha
federal action to bring suit in the state court, a limitation
complied with in this case.

Therefore, Pioneer's cause of action

is not barred by the three year statute of limitations.
POINT III
WAIVER AND LACHES WERE NOT BRIEFED OR ARGUED
BY THE PARTIES AND THEREFORE SHOULD NOT BE A
BASIS
FOR
SUMMARY
JUDGMENT.
Defendants'

Motion

for

Partial

Summary Judgment,

upon which the Third Judicial District Court entered it's
Judgment, moved for Summary Judgment against the first and
third causes of action set forth in Pioneer's Complaint on the
basis that Pioneer's claims were barred by applicable statutes
-18-

of

limitations.

raised

or

Neither

addressed

the defendants

any

issues

or

the plaintiff

concerning

whether

the

plaintiff's causes of action were barred by waiver and laches.
Judge Uno's Minute Entry granting judgment for the
defendants on their Motion for Summary Judgment states only
"Based on Pleadings and Memoranda filed, the Court grants
defendants1 Motion for Partial Summary Judgment.
oral argument is denied.

Motion for

Defendant to prepare the Order".

Judge Uno made no specific findings or drafted any memorandum
decision.

Pursuant to the Court's Minute Entry, counsel for

the defendant prepared

the Order

that was entered, which

includes a basis for Summary Judgment of waiver and laches.
Plaintiff specifically objected to the inclusion of waiver and
laches as a basis for Summary Judgment on the Motion for
Partial Summary Judgment.

Not withstanding, the Court entered

the judgment.
It is well established law in this state that Summary
Judgment "should not been done on conjecture, but only when the
matter

is clear, and

in case of doubt, the doubt should be

resolved in allowing the challenged party the opportunity of at
least

attempting

to

prove

his

right

to recover."

Margetts, 571 P.2d 1332, 1334 (Utah 1977).
proper

only

if

the

pleadings,

Duham v.

"Summary Judgment is

depositions,

affidavits

and

admissions show that there is no genuine issue of material fact
-19-

and that the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law.

If there is any doubt or uncertainty concerning questions of

factf

the doubt

should

be resolved

in favor of the opposing

Utah State University v. Sutro and Company, 6 46 P.2d 1..5

party."

(Utah 1982).
Although the defendants raised waiver and laches as a
defense in their Answer, there were no affidavits, deposition;*,
admissions, or any other pleading or memoranda filed addressi lg
said defense as a basis for the defendants1 Motion for Parti il
Summary Judgment.

The inclusion of waiver and laches as a basis

for Summary Judgment has resulted

in the denial of Pioneer's

constitutional right of due process.
The

Utah

State

Supreme

Court

has

on

at

least

t^o

occasions had an opportunity to address similar issues involving
Rule 12(b)(6) Motions.

Both cases involved Rule 12(b)(6) Motions

that also consider matters outside of pleadings and thus treated
by

the

District

disposed

of

instances

pertinent

said

the

opportunity

Court

to
in

as

Motions

District
the

a Motion
as

entering

provided

Court

plaintiff
a

did
to

Summary

defendants and moving parties.

for

Summary

in
not

Rule

Judgment and
56.

provide

present

all

Judgment

in

In bcth
reasonable

material
favor

of

made
the

In Stran v. Associated Students of

University of Utah, 561 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1977), the Court held:
Once the determination is made to consider
the materials, the mandatory provision of
-20-

Rule 12(b) controls, vis., all parties
must
be
given
adequate
notice
and
opportunity
to
submit
supporting
materials,
particularly
the
party
against whom summary judgment is entered.
It is error to consider a motion to
dismiss as a motion for summary judgment,
without giving the adverse party an
opportunity to present pertinent material.
The action of the trial court in denying
the plaintiff the reasonable opportunity
to present controverting material violated
the mandate of the Rule.
Similarly the Utah Supreme Court held in Bekins Bar V
Ranch v. Utah Farm Production, 587 P.2d 151, 152 (Utah 1978):
This record does not clearly show that
plaintiff was given". . . reasonable
opportunity to present all material made
pertinent. . ." by a Rule 56 motion for
summary judgment.
We hold that it is necessary that the
record
clearly
and
affirmatively
demonstrate that when a motion to dismiss
is made and". . . matters outside the
pleading are presented to and not excluded
by the court. . ."
that all parties
(including, of course, the non-movant which
was the plaintiff in this case) are given
responsible
opportunity
to
present
additional pertinent material if they wish.
(Cites omitted).
In the present case, waiver and laches were never
plead by the defendants as a basis for their Motion for Partial
Summary Judgment.

The defendants Memorandum in support of its

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment gave no notice nor addressed
said

issue;

no

affidavits

or

-21-

memoranda

were

submitted.

Therefore, Pioneer
laches.

never

addressed

any claim of waiver and

To enter a judgment on the basis of waiver and laches

without providing Pioneer, the responding party, the opportunity
to present

additional

pertinent material

if

they

so wished

violates Pioneer's constitutional right to due process of law.
POINT IV
DOES ACTUAL NOTICE SATISFY THE NOTICE
REQUIREMENTS OF §7-15-1 ET SEQ. , UTAH
CODE ANNOTATED (1953 AS AMENDED)?
Pioneer's

Third

Cause

of

Action

is

based

on

tie

defendants issuing and delivering checks to Pioneer pursuant :o
the

payroll

presentment

deduction
for

program,

insufficient

that

funds.

were
The

dishonored
Cause

of

upon
Action

incorporated liability under §7-15-1, Utah Code Annotated (1953 as
amended).

Section 7-15-1(1) provides:
Any person who makes, draws, signs, or
issues any check, draft, order, or other
instrument upon any depository institution,
whether as corporate agent or otherwise,
for the purpose of obtaining from any
person, firm, partnership, or corporation
any money, merchandise, property, or other
thing of value or paying for any service,
wages, salary, or rent is liable to the
holder of the check, draft, order, or other
instrument if the check, draft, order, or
other instrument is not honored upon
presentment and is marked "refer to maker"
or the account upon which the check, draft,
order, or other instrument has been made or
drawn does not exist, has been closed, or
does
not
have
sufficient
funds
or
sufficient credit for payment in full of
the check, draft, or other instrument,
(emphasis added).
-22-

Section 7-15-1(2) Utah Code Annotated establishes that
"written notice of intent to file civil action" be sent to the
maker of the dishonored check to "allow the person seven days
from the date on which the notice is mailed to tender payment in
fullf plus the service charge imposed for the dishonored check."
The legislature then, in Section 7-15-2(2) U.C.A., set forth the
basic form that said notice should take under §7-15-1(2).

The

apparent intent of the legislature in requiring the prelitigation
notice, as acknowledged by the defendants in their Memorandum in
Opposition to Plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgmentf page 125,
"is to provide the makers of dishonored checks an opportunity to
correct the problem before expensive litigation is commenced."
In the present case, although Pioneer did not draft written
notice as set out in §§7-15-1(2) and 7-15-2(2), and deposit it in
the United States Mails, wherein notice is "conclusively presumed
to have been given," §7-15-2(1), Pioneer provided actual notice
"in person" to the defendants, as provided for in §7-15-2(1).
By way of personal meetings with Mr. Fred S. Rico,
President of Pioneer Credit Union, the defendants were informed
that the checks had been dishonored and given the opportunity to
correct the problem.

In response to said actual notice, the

defendants assured Mr. Rico that the credit union would be paid
for the dishonored checks, and entered

into the payment plan

resulting in the partial payments received through July 6, 1983.
-23-

Pioneer believes that it has gone one step beyond the
requirement set forth in §7-15-1(2) and §7-15-2(2)f by providing
the defendants with actual notice "in person" rather than merely
depositing written notice in the United States mail, and having
notice "conclusively presumed to have been given."

Therefore,

plaintiff's claims against the defendants for the issuance of
the

dishonored

checks

should

not

be

barred

by

the

notice

requirements set forth in §7-15-1 and §7-15-2.
Assuming

arguendo,

that

this

Court

requires

that

specific compliance with the written notice requirements set
forth

in

Sections

7-15-1(2)

and

7-15-2(2)

be

made,

said

requirement is merely procedural and should not result in a
dismissal of Pioneer's claims upon the merits.

The Utah State

Supreme Court on at least two occasions when the plaintiffs have
failed to provide written notice as required under the Utah
Health Care Malpractice Act, §78-14-8, Utah Code Annotated (1953
as amended), has held that such failure was merely a procedural
defect

allowing

the

plaintiff

one

year

from

the date of

dismissal to provide notice and refile the action.
Ballinger, 601 P.2d 144, 150 (Utah 1979), held:
Section
78-14-8
merely
prescribes
a
condition precedent to the filing of a
summons or a complaint.
A failure to
comply with such conditions does not
constitute an ajudication on the merits,
but is merely a procedural defect that
does not relate to the merits of the basic
action in any way.
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In Foil v.

Center,

The Court again

in, Yates v. Vernal

617

354

P.2d

352,

(Utah

1980),

Family
further

Health
stated

"Therefore, pursuant to §78-12-40, appellant has one year from
the dismissal of that action-or, in this situation, one year from
the

filing

Consistent

of
with

this opinion-in
the

Ballinger, supra, and

which

Supreme Court's

to bring
ruling

Yates v. Vernal

that action,"

in both

Family

Foil v.

Health Center,

supra, should this Court determine that Pioneer in fact failed to
provide the required notice pursuant to §7-15-1, et. seq., said
failure to comply is merely a procedural defect and Pioneer has
one year from the filing of this Court's opinion in which to
provide notice and refile its action.

CONCLUSION AND RELIEF SOUGHT
The trial court errored

in granting

the defendants

Motion for Partial Summary Judgment resulting in dismissing all
of Plaintiff's causes of action.

Plaintiff's causes of action

are not barred by any three year statute of limitation.

All

applicable statutes of limitations were tolled by the partial
payments made through July 6, 198 3.
Pioneer's filing of it's Complaint in the United States
District Court on or about July 1, 1986, constituted a timely
filing.

The subsequent dismissal by the Federal District Court
-25-

for lack of federal jurisdiction on the federal and pendant state
claims is other than upon the merits, and pursuant to §78-12-40,
Utah Code Annotated (1953 as amended) Pioneer had one year fron
the date of the dismissal to commence a new action.
The trial court's inclusion of of waiver and laches is
not supported by any pleadings, memoranda or affidavit thereby
denying Pioneer

its constitutional

right to due process whe 1

included in the Summary Judgment.
The notice requirements under §7-15-1, et. seq., wera
satisfied by the actual notice given to defendants by Pioneer
during conversations with Pioneer's President, Fred S. Rico. Ii
the alternative, failure to strictly comply with the conditions
set forth in §7-15-1, et. seq., is merely a procedural defect
whereby, pursuant to §78-12-40, Pioneer will have one year from
the date of this Court's

filing of its opinion, to provide

written notice and refile its complaint.
Therefore, the precise

relief

sought

by plaintiff,

Pioneer Credit Union, is that the Summary Judgment in favor cf
the defendants, be reversed and the case be remanded to tire
District Court.
DATED this

/j^

day of June, 1990.
RICHARDS, BIESINGER, WOLFERT & NEFF
S^^WUSl (^^J^du^c^

BkucV L.

RICHARDS7
L. TASMAN BIESINGER
Attorneys for Appellant
Pioneer Credit Union
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A D D E N D U M

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

7-13-1
CHAPTER 13

SAVINGS AND LOAN ACT
(Repealed by Laws 1975, ch. 150, § 1; 1977,
ch. 19, § 8; 1981, ch. 16, § 1.)
7-13-1 to 7-13-74. Repealed.
CHAPTER 14
CREDIT INFORMATION EXCHANGE
Section
7-14-1.
7-14-2.
7-14-3.
7-14-4.
7-14-5.

7-14-5. Reciprocal exchange of information nn
thorized.
One or more financial institutions may jointly
agree with one or more other financial institutions
for the reciprocal exchange of any information authc?
rized to be reported by the provisions of this chapter!
Such reciprocal exchange of information or the acts or
refusals to act of one or more recipients because of
such information shall not constitute a boycott of
blacklist, or otherwise be a basis for liability to any
person on the part of any participant in the reciprocal
exchange of information authorized by this chapter/
mi

Definitions.
Legislative findings.
Information an institution may furnish.
Immunity from liability.
Reciprocal exchange of information authorized.

7-14-1. Definitions.
As used in this chapter
(1) "Depository institution" means any institution authorized by state or federal law to accept
and hold demand deposits or other accounts
which may be used to effect third party payment
transactions. The definition of "depository institution" in Chapter 1 does not apply to Chapter 4
[14].
(2) "Credit reporting agency" includes any cooperative credit reporting agency maintained by
an association of financial institutions or one or
more associations of merchants.
lssi
,7-14-2. Legislative findings.
-The substantial financial loss to the state and to
trade and commerce"withinlthis'state resulting from
the dishonor or other return of checks, drafts, or other
orders for the payment of money, including transactions to be consummated by electronic means, requires concerted effort by financial institutions to attempt to minimize the number of such occurrences.
The Legislature finds that to facilitate such concerted
effort adequate protection against liability of the pari-itf^ina+imcr fi«ori**Jol i n a + i t i i t i n n a i a n a M t a a a r v

. lOAi"

7-14-3. Information an institution may furnish.
^ A n y institution doing business in the state may
report to any other financial institution, or credit reporting agency the following: (1) that an account
maintained to effect third party payment transactions has been closed out by the institution, the reasons therefor, and the identity of the depositor or account holder; (2) upon the request of another financial institution any other information in the files of
the institution relating to the credit experience of the
reporting institution with respect to a particular person as to whom inquiry is made; and (3) any information concerning attempted or potential activity to defraud a financial institution or to obtain funds from a
financial institution by fraudulent or other unlawful
means or other information relating to individuals
sought by law enforcement authorities for alleged violations of criminal laws.
isei
7-14-4. Immunity from liability.
r.No depository institution making any report or
communication of information authorized by this
chapter shall be liable to any person for disclosing
such information to any recipient authorized to receive this information under this chapter, or for any
error or omission in such report or communication.
1981

196

CHAPTER 15
DISHONORED INSTRUMENTS
Section
7-15-1.
7-15-2.
7-15-3.

Civil liability of issuer — Notice of action
— Collection costs.
Notice — Form.
Liability of financial institution upon
wrongful dishonor.

7-15-1. Civil liability of issuer—Notice of action
—. Collection costs.
£ j l ) Any person who makes, draws, signs, or issues
any check, draft, order, or other instrument upon air?
Repository institution, whether as corporate agent or
oth«srwteer for the purpose of oblaining from any per|
son,J firm, partnership, or corporation any money'
merchandise, property, or other thing of value or paying for any service, wages, salaj-y, or rent is liableJo
the holder of the check, draft, order, or other instrivment if the check, draft, order, or other instrument is
not honored upon presentment and is marked "refer
to maker" or the account upon which the check, draft,
order, or other instrument has been made or drawn'
does not exist, has been closed, or does not have sufficient funds or sufficient credit for payment in full of
the check, draft, or other instrument . -:- z: ;A^
j ^ ^ T h e holder of the check, draft, order, or other^
instrument which has been dishonored may give
written or verbal notice of dishonor to the person"
making, drawing, signing, or issuing the check, draft,
order, or otherjnstrument and may impose a service
cnarge that may not exceed $15. Prior to filing an'
action based upon this section, the holder of a dishonored check, draft, order, or other instrument shall
give the person making, drawing, signing, or issuing
the dishonored check, draft, order, or other instrument written notice of intent to file civil action, allowing the person seven days from the date on which
the notice was mailed to tender payment in full, plus
the service charge imposed for the dishonored check,
draft, order, or other instrument.
(3) In a civil action, the person making, drawing,
signing, or issuing the check, draft, order, or other
instrument is liable to the holder for.
(a) the amount of the check, draft, order, or
other instrument;
(b) interest; and
(c) all costs of collection, including all court
costs and reasonable attorneys' fees.
(4) As used in this section, "costs of collection" includes reasonable compensation, as approved by the
court, for time expended if the collection is pursued
personally by the holder and not through an agent
1968

FINANCIAL INSTITUTIONS

iyv

7-16-2*

7-15-2. Notice — Form,

Section

(1) "Notice" means notice given to the person making, drawing, or issuing the check, draft, order, or
other instrument either in person or in writing. A
written notice is conclusively presumed to have been
given when properly deposited in the United States
mails, postage prepaid, by certified or registered
mail, return receipt requested, and addressed to the
signer at his address as it appears on the check, draft,
order, or other instrument or at his last-known address.
(2) Written notice as applied in Subsection
7-15-1(2) shall take substantially the following form:
Date:
To:
You are hereby notified that the check(s) described
below issued by you has been returned to us unpaid:
Instrument date:
Instrument number
Originating institution:
Amount:
Reason for dishonor (marked on instrument):

connect with regional or national systems.
7-16-10. Contractual waiver of Uniform Commercial Code provisions.
7-16-11 to 7-16-18. Repealed.
7-16-19. Installation and operation of automatic
teller machine — Notice — Approval or
disapproval by commissioner — Restrictions.

This instrument, together with a service charge of
$15 must be paid to the undersigned within seven
days from the date of this notice in accordance with
Section 7-15-l,JUtah Code Annotated 1953, or appropriate civil legal action may be filed against you for
the amount due and owing together with service
charges, interest, court costs, attorneys' fees, and actual costs of collection as provided by law.
%,ln addition, £he criminal code provides in Section
J7j?^5?5» JJtah Code Annotated 1953 that any person
who* issues or ^passes a check fcr"thewpayment of
money, for the purpose of obteming from any person,
fim/partnership,"or
corporation^ any paoney, property,'~or othjer^thing'of value or paying for any services,'wages, salary, labor, for rent, knowing it will
not be paid by the drawee and payment is refused by
the drawee, is guilty of issuing a bad check.
The civil action referred to in this notice does not
preclude the right to prosecute under the criminal
[code of the state of Utah.
(Signed)
Name of Holder:
•Address of Holder:
.Telephone Number:

,
t

IMS

7-15-3.

Liability of financial institution u o o n
wrongful dishonor.
HOT a person'is liable to a holder under Section
7-15-1, and the liability is proximately caused by a
financial institution's wrongful dishonor under Section 70A-4-402, any award against the financial institution under Section 70A-4-402 shall include, but not
be limited to, all amounts awarded against the person
to the holder under Section 7-15-1.
1968
CHAPTER 16
CONSUMER F U N D S T R A N S F E R
FACILITIES ACT
Section
7-16-1.
7-16-2.
7-16-3.

Repealed.
Definitions.
Application of act — Restrictions on use of
facilities.
7-16-4 to 7-16-8. Repealed.
. 7-16-9.
Authority to make facilities available to institutions in contiguous states and to

7-16-1.

Repealed.

1965

7-16-2* Definitions.
As used in this chapter
(1) "Automated teller machine" means an unmanned, free-standing electronic information
processing device, located separate and apart
from a financial institution's principal office,
branch, or detached facility, which uses either
the direct transmission of electronic impulses to
a financial institution or the recording of electronic impulses or other indicia of a transaction
for delayed transmission to a financial institution in order to perform financial transactions.
(2) "Point-of-sale terminal" means a manned
electronic information processing device, other
lhan a telephone, located at the point of sale and
separate and apart from a financial institution's
principal office, '"branch,~kor detached facility,
which uses either the direct transmission of electronic impulses to a financial institution or the
recording of,electronic impulses "or other indicia
bf a transaction for delayed,transmission to a financial institution in order to perform financial
^transactions.' However,' "point-of-sale terminals
^includes electronic information^ processing devices which interface with the telephone transmission system and which^either through the
direct transmission of electronic impulses or the
recording and delayed transmission of electronic
impulses to a financial institution, perform financial transactions. Nothing in this definition
prevents a device which constitutes a point-ofsale terminal from being used to perform, for its
operator, any internal business functions that
ws**iiot ffomTifiw? transactions. **•&* - ft* (3) "Financial transaction'' means cash withdrawals, deposits, account transfers, payments
from deposit, loan or thrift accounts, disbursem1enta~ander~a ^reauthorized credit agreement,
or loan payments and other similar transactions
initiated by an account holder. '
J
* (4) "Consumer funds transfer facility" means
either an automated teller machine, or a point-ofsale terminal, including any supporting equipment, structures, or systems. A point-of-sale terminal owned or operated by and on the premises
of a person primarily engaged in the business of
selling or leasing goods or non-financial services
and capable of performing the functions of a consumer funds transfer facility, is not considered to
be a consumer funds transfer facility unless connected on-line or off-line to a financial institution
for the purpose of performing financial transactions.
(5) "Merchant" means a person primarily engaged m the retail sale or lease of goods or nonfinancial services.
(6) "Control" means ownership, directly or indirectly, of a majority of the outstanding shares
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